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In The Making of the Indebted Man, Maurizio Lazzarato claims that the subject of late capitalism is the indebted man. On the one hand, liabilities shape class relations, while on the other hand indebtedness is a tool for making subjectivity 
appropriate to class relations. Following Friedrich Nietzsche, Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari, Lazzarato stresses that debt became infinite with the beginning of Christianity. 
The shift to infinite debt or ‘guilt’ occurred because of the emergence of despotism 
and monotheism, which are new forms of social and religious life: “The particularity 
of Christianity lies in the fact that it places us not only within a system of debt, but 
also within a system of ‘interiorized debt.’”2 Sin is the main concept that underlies the 
mechanism of guilt, which cannot be redeemed since the creditor belongs to the sphere 
of the sacrum. The infinite relation of indebtedness was inherited by capitalism, which 
made debt immanent through its “secularization” on the economic level.3 The concept 
1  The following text is revised version of the author’s presentation given at the Deleuze and the Passions conference, 
Rotterdam, 17.05.2014.
2  Maurizio Lazzarato, The Making of the Indebted Man: An essay on the Neoliberal Condition, trans. Joshua D. Jordan (Los 
Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2012), 78.
3  Ibid., 77–78.
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of debt refers to the power that captures people’s capacity to act. This capture happens 
on two levels: on the level of political and market institutions, where the state acts as 
an apparatus of capture, and on the level of individualization, where it is connected to 
the passional regime as the main mode of subjectification in capitalism. 
On the following pages—“indebted” to Lazzarato’s interpretation—the notion 
of debt is understood as an assemblage of sad passions and considered in relation 
to social transformations that have led to contemporary societies of control.4 
Unlike Lazzarato’s essay, the main topic of this chapter will be the connection 
between the concept of debt—encompassing varying assemblages of affects and 
passions—and individualization. Firstly, I consider the concepts of control, debt and 
affect. Secondly, I discuss their relation to the forces and assemblages typical for 
contemporary societies. In order to grasp the social meaning of the philosophical 
analysis my discussion will involve a sociological excursion, demonstrating the social 
processes that previously were described in terms of philosophical analysis. 
Control and subjectification
Deleuze uses the notion of “society of control” in an interview with Antonio 
Negri5 and in a short article entitled: “Postscript on the Societies of Control.”6 
Control is the latest mutation of power and can be seen as a further development 
of Michel Foucault’s concept of modes of power characteristic for modern societies. 
Control operates through ‘soft’ (i.e. they do not recall threat of physical coercion) 
and open assemblages, unlike the enclosed spaces of the panopticon, factory or 
prison, which are characteristic of disciplinary power.7
Confinements are molds, distinct moldings, while controls are a modulation, 
like a self-transmuting molding continually changing from one moment to 
the next or like a sieve whose mesh varies from one point to another.8
Control is short-term and rapidly shifting, but at the same time continuous 
and unbounded, whereas discipline was long-term, infinite, and discontinuous. 
A man is no longer a man confined but a man in debt.9
4  Here, stress will be put on a less obvious and compelling aspect of control than cyber technology. For sociological 
descriptions of changing assemblages of technology and (institutional) power see Michalis Lianos, “Dangerization and 
the End of Deviance: The Institutional Environment,” British Journal of Criminology 40, no. 2 (2000): 261-278.
5  Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations: 1972–1990, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 169-
176.
6  Ibid., 177-182.
7 This does not imply that in societies where the power of control dominates the disciplinary power and its typical 
machines disappear. The notion of control (or discipline, or any other) refers to the predominant type of power in a 
particular time and space.
8  Deleuze, Negotiations, 178-9.
9  Ibid., 181.
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The power of control operates through cybernetic machines which facilitate 
constant modulation of individuals and appropriation of singularities. However, as 
Deleuze points out, what counts are the collective assemblages that the machines 
enter. In other words, what creates control is not the usage of cyber technology, but 
rather assemblages of power which are typically continuous and flexible. This means 
that control recognizes and connects with the processes that take place in society. 
Control, being a sieve with a transmuting mesh, operates through an open system. It is 
infinite in the sense that it does not divide one’s life (or social roles) into closed entities, 
but “transmutes” it over the course of time; from school to work, and from work to 
retirement (think of lifelong learning). Control is much harder to perceive and oppose, 
since power has become immanent, whereas in disciplinary society power used to be 
external, exercised by disciplinary institutions.10 Therefore, the term “power of control” 
is to some extent misguiding. For Deleuze, society is not external to the individual, but 
rather a necessary milieu and a condition for human beings to live. This is why notions 
of individuality, originality, and authenticity belong to the dictionary of the very same 
social assemblage which creates subjects free from external influences. On a second, 
theoretical level, control refers to the creation of subjectivity, for which “infinite” 
means “immanent”. Power needs to be understood twofold: as the power to act or 
to “affect and be affected”—that is, as potentiality (puissance)—, and as an external 
relation of forces, or social power (pouvoir).11  Besides visible power relations, there 
is always another factor, namely socialization. Socialization is the manner of creating 
subjects in a specific time and place. In the latest mutation of capitalism, control is 
accompanied by a specific mode of subjectification which in A Thousand Plateaus is 
called the passional regime of signs.12 A regime of signs is “any specific [linguistic] 
formalization of expression”13 that is related to other fields and practices that are non-
linguistic: “there is always a form of content that is simultaneously inseparable from and 
independent of the form of expression, and the two forms pertain to assemblages that 
are not principally linguistic.”14 The discursive content is strongly related to social and 
political structures, with technology and techniques used in a particular time and place 
(dispositif). A semiotic system is never pure; it is always a mixture of various semiotic 
regimes. Deleuze and Guattari, however, extracted traits characterizing four types of 
semiotic regimes: presignifying, signifying, postsignifying and countersignifying semiotics. 
Semiotic regimes creates a different regime of signs (paranoid and passional are of higher 
importance here as they refer to subjectification in modern societies). The passional 
regime, which is connected to postsignifying semiotics, is described as follows:
10 For example, prisons, schools, factories, all of which based on system of penalties and function according to strict rules.
11 Brian Massumi, “Notes on the Translation and Acknowledgements”, in A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1987), xvii.
12 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 120.
13 Ibid., 111.
14 Ibid.
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There is no longer a signifier-signified relation, but a subject of enunciation 
issuing from the point of subjectification and a subject of the statement in 
a determinable relation to the first subject. There is no longer sign-to-sign 
circularity, but a linear proceeding into which the sign is swept via subjects.15 
Subjectification is a key process here. Deleuze and Guattari see the Cartesian 
cogito (the reasonable, accountable and -what is even more important- individualized 
and professing one) as an example of the kind of subjectivity that is created in the 
passional regime. At the same time the individualized ego is an outcome of a strange 
socialization which subjects it to the society in which it does not believe. In other 
words, regimes of signs as part of a semiotic system are modes of socialization, 
which means that they can be interpreted as another attempt made by philosophical 
duo of Deleuze and Guattari- after Anti-Oedipus- to describe the social. The first one, 
made in Anti-Oedipus, based analysis on the notion of social machines. 
Semiotic regimes can be arranged in a series: presignifying–signifying–
postsignifying–countersignifying. In the case of social machines, these are series of 
territorial–despotic–capitalist machines which correspond to the series of regimes of 
signs.16 The series do not coincide, however, because they do not exhibit the same 
phenomena, but rather present alternative manners of conducting a philosophical 
analysis of society. In the case of semiotic regimes stress is put on the psychological 
dimension of socialization (modes of subjectification), whereas social machines refer 
also to a dimension of this process different from the psychological one, i.e. the 
historical, structural dimension. Hence, these are two models of analysis: the one 
based on semiotic regimes refers to language as an important subjectifying factor, 
while the other one uses the notion of social machines. The latter can be called a 
Marxist model of analysis, because desire is conceived here in terms of production 
and its relation to the socius (the social and its structure). The birth of society is at the 
same time the birth of the subject, because of which the notion of socialization—and 
individualization as its type—can be understood as a synonym for subjectification.
Both series of semiotic regimes and social machines present the genealogy 
of subjectivity inspired by Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals. The first, “primitive” 
machine corresponds to presignifying semiotics: the sign does not have the power of 
enunciation of a subject nor is it fixed and stable. Moreover, the inscription on the 
body (mnemotechnics) and the establishment of the subject-debtor, as was shown 
in the Genealogy of Morals,17 takes place in a collective which is not yet organized 
in a form of State. Signifying semiotics is initiated when the State overcodes the 
15 Ibid., 127.
16 They can be compared with Foucault’s sovereignty–discipline–biopolitics/security.
17 According to Nietzsche painful inscriptions on the body were the preliminary condition for establishment of individual 
as a subject who can remember and make promises. Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, ed. Walter 
Kaufmann, trans. Walter Kaufmann and Reginald J. Hollingdale, published together with Ecce Homo, ed. and trans. 
Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 60–64.
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presignifying semiotics. That means that on the level of social organization 
human position in the group is now dependent on ones social and “economic” 
functions, features of his or her work (specialization). The political regime takes 
shape of despotic, aristocratic one. In Mille plateaux this shift is consider from a 
poststructuralist point of view where modes of subjectification are having semiotic 
character. Presignifying semiotics becomes signifying which leads to a despotic regime 
that can be read as a genetic basis for modern socialization. In the despotic social 
machine, the signifying regime of signs is characterized by circularity and infinity 
(every sign belongs to a chain that creates circles of interpretation; it is possible 
for a sign to change a chain—to be subjected under another center—but not to 
escape the system). The center is transcendent: “the infinite set of signs refers to a 
supreme signifier presenting itself as both lack and excess (the despotic signifier, the 
limit of the system’s deterritorialization) […].”18 Signifying semiotics function along 
the lines of sovereign and disciplinary power in which the state apparatus is equal to 
(the body of) the sovereign-despot. At the same time it is the machine/regime where 
capitalism proceeds and develops. The instantaneous accumulation and expansion 
characteristic for capitalism comes to fruition in the next regime: the postsignifying 
regime. Here also the State is an important figure of power, although it acts as an 
outside axis supporting capitalist machine. For the capitalist machine, the State is still 
an apparatus of capture and a mode of actualization. The State appropriates the labor 
force and turns subjects into fixed identities (citizen, teacher), whose functionings are 
simultaneously deterritorialized, questioned and changed by capitalism. As Deleuze 
and Guattari state, postsignifying semiotics: 
is defined by a decisive external occurrence, by a relation with the outside 
that is expressed more as an emotion than an idea, and more as effort or 
action than imagination (‘active delusion rather than ideational delusion’); 
by a limited constellation operating in a single sector […].19
Socialization operates here through interpellation,20 i.e., subjectification now implies 
the establishment of the ‘ego’ as a subject and a synonym of a human being. This is 
the most individualizing and abstract regime and because of the lack of a hierarchical 
point of subjectification, it is the most immanent one as well. In this sense it has a lot 
in common with capitalism as a machine operating through control:
A transcendent object that is more and more spiritualized, for a field of 
forces that is more and more immanent, more and more internalized. This 
describes the evolution of the infinite debt through Catholicism to the 
18 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 117.
19 Ibid., 120.
20 Ibid., 130. 
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Reformation. The extreme spiritualization of the despotic State and the 
extreme internalization of the capitalist field define bad conscience.21
The relation of indebtedness that accompanied capitalism and socialization along 
the very beginning changes with the transformations of its machines and semiotic 
regimes. Before clarifying the meaning of the above quotation that forms the core 
of this essay, other ‘actors’—the seer, the priest, and the prophet—corresponding to 
those machines, need to be introduced, being key ‘elements’ of semiotic assemblages 
and figures of affects. 
Affect and debt 
The divide between affect and emotion and between subjective becoming 
and a subjective feeling is a new Deleuzian element in the philosophy of affects.22 
Without delving into the issue, it may be said that this definitional change allows 
the philosopher to write a general philosophy of nature, grasping the metaphysical 
postulate of the univocity of being (a human being is also a part of nature) and the 
multiplicity of its ‘actualizations.’ For social philosophy, this change in definition has 
equally important consequences. Firstly, a human being as a part of nature consists 
of multiple relations that cannot be reduced to the unity of self-consciousness. 
This move does not establish the individual as an emotional rather than a rational 
subject. On the contrary, it exceeds the opposition of emotional–rational. Secondly, 
an appropriate description of contemporary society needs terms that allow us to 
express the complexity and immanence of power23 relations. Although it is tempting 
to straightforwardly call relations of power in society “control”, this notion covers 
only one of multiple dimensions. Control is an element of one of the possible series 
of assemblages that enables us to think about contemporaneity. In order to bring 
the question of passions to the assemblage of control, the figures of the priest and 
the prophet need to be introduced as the names of those passions that connect with 
the mutations of debt in different social assemblages. Let us back to previously 
introduced problematics of regimes of sings in order to investigate the connections 
between them and the notion of control.
The figure of the priest came onto the scene with infinite debt, both introduced 
by the despotic regime (i.e., the despotic machine or the signifying regime of 
signs). The previous machine or regime of signs is characterized by territoriality and 
collective “identification”. In this assemblage, however, socialization begins. Debt, 
the mode of creating a subject, is finite: it can be repaid, and re-established because 
21 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and 
Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 268.
22 Jason Read, “The Affective Economy: Producing and Consuming Affects in Deleuze and Guattari”, in Deleuze and the 
Passions, ed. Ceciel Meiborg and Sjoerd van Tuinen (New York: Punctum Books, 2016).
23 Here: puissance and pouvoir.
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there is no signifying center to which it may be assigned. For the same reason the 
priest does not operate here. The situation changes with the establishment of a 
State that consists of a two-fold apparatus of capture: the despot embodies a direct 
filiation with transcendence (the center of significance) and the priest interprets 
God’s words.24 Accordingly, the multiplication of these “attractors” (the State 
and the temple) enables the establishment of the subject, which is individual and 
related to the infinite and transcendent. The debt also becomes infinite: it cannot 
be paid off, as it is incurred to God (like in the idea of the original sin). According 
to Nietzsche, infinite debt, the debt that cannot be repaid, was God’s creation as he 
was the creditor who sacrificed himself for his debtor, making the debt unrepayable.25 
The role of the priest is to invoke this infinite indebtedness through interpretation of 
God’s words and human actions. The modern psychoanalyst is the last type of priest, 
according to Deleuze and Guattari.26 He or she endlessly gives interpretations that 
always follow an internalized and spiritualized Oedipal triangle. The specificity of 
the psychoanalyst-priest lies in the fact that the true interpreter is the client herself/
himself and the process of interpretation never ends.27 The descriptions above refer 
to the signifying semiotics. 
There is, however, another regime of signs which functions in contemporary 
capitalism in a mixture with signifying semiotics: postsignifying semiotics. These 
semiotics and machinic assemblages follow another figure: the prophet who stands 
against the State apparatus, because in creating a new community28 he does not 
need to interpret God’s will, as he already incorporates it. This means that the 
prophet anticipates and obeys his will, even when he avoids doing what God 
commanded. 
Unlike the seer [priest], the prophet interprets nothing: his delusion is active 
rather than ideational or imaginative; his relation to God is passional and 
authoritative rather than despotic and signifying; he anticipates and detects 
the powers (puissances) of the future rather than applying past and present 
powers (pouvoirs).29
The difference between the two types of spiritual figures lies in their relationship 
to power. The priest is an executor or transmitter of established relations, while 
the prophet does not create new ones but confines himself to changes initiated by 
others. In this sense, the prophet is a figure of control that does not repress in a strict 
sense but operates like a sieve with a transmuting mesh. It seems that the figure of 
24 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 116.
25 Ibid., 217.
26 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 114.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., 360, 383.
29 Ibid., 124.
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the prophet coincides with the transformation of debt into capitalist debt, due to 
the indefinite postponement accompanied by the anteriority of the indebtedness in 
relation to the debtor. According to Deleuze and Guattari, in capitalism the desire turns 
against itself similarly as it happens with relations of forces under the postsignifying 
regime of signs.30 The death instinct in the subject is a “negative” desire. If desire is 
understood in terms of forces and relations of powers (puissances), then the aversion of 
desire may be interpreted as the domination of sad affects, that is of passivity.
The priest and the prophet are the names for particular and multiple organizations 
of forces and their relations. In the case of the priest the relation between powers 
is passive, as he can only capture already existing powers. The prophet, however, 
has the ability to anticipate and detect future relations of forces, which gives him 
the power to reverse the relation of power between forces. In this sense, the term 
“capturing of powers to act” can be understood as describing a manner in which 
control and semiotic figures function in capitalism. Contrary to the priest who 
acts “from without”, the prophet operates “from within”. In other words, higher 
abstraction is followed by incorporation. Hence, the prophet does not belong to the 
State apparatus, which can only capture singularities and becomings. The prophet, 
as a figure of capitalism, does not capture, but plugs into actual processes, which 
contributes to the immanentization of debt in capitalism.
Individuality and class relations (a sociological interlude)
Lazzarato distinguishes three kinds of debt that simultaneously penetrate 
political and individual lives. Private, sovereign and social debts correspond to 
the spheres of operation of governmentality and the making of different kinds of 
subjects,31 such as juridical and economical, which refer to the spheres of state and 
market respectively. However, these figures could not cover the multiplicity of 
relations between those to be governed. In 1970s there was a danger of a “split” 
of governmentality into separate branches, which necessitated the invention of 
another sphere: the social. The emergence and existence of the social is strictly 
related to liberal governing32 and encompasses both political and economic 
subjects. 
Nikolas Rose makes a similar diagnosis of the social sphere. However, this 
sociologist uses the term “governing through communities”33 to point out the 
changes which occurred in the social sphere. The characteristic for contemporaneity 
is division, dislocation and relocation of the “social” functions performed 
30 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 217.
31 Lazzarato, The Making of the Indebted Man, 122-125.
32 Ibid., 125.
33 Nikolas Rose, “The Death of the Social? Re-figuring the Territory of Government”, in Economy and Society 25, no. 3 
(1996): 328, 352 [reprinted in: Governing the Present. Administering Economic, Social and Personal Life, ed. Peter Miller 
and Nikolas Rose (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), 85-113].
34 Ibid., 339.
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previously by the state. Society was a correlate of the welfare state, capturing 
individuals with the notions of social: protection, rights, justice, and solidarity.34 
At the end of the twentieth century, liberalism underwent a mutation and a new 
“idea” gained dominance: the community. Community brings three major changes: 
fragmentation (now the “point of attachment” of individuals is local and limited, 
but not necessarily located in particular space); the growing importance of 
identity discourse (identification with communities and having one’s own identity 
is an obligation and a calling for every individual); and the introduction of moral 
language and valorization (one’s social position, economic status health or lifestyle 
is judged ethically). The subject is seen as responsible, self-creating and reflexive as 
her/his bonds with the community are emotive and elective. The individual is both 
rational and emotional, making her/his morally responsible for herself/himself and 
the community.35 An important attribute of the community is that it “exists and is 
to be achieved, yet the achievement is nothing more than the birth-to-presence of 
a form of being which pre-exists.”36 The status of the community in contemporary 
society is linked to the process of individualization. According to sociologist 
Ulrich Beck, individualization is a mode of socialization, which is characterized 
by the privatization of risk in people’s lives because of the withdrawal of the 
nation state from its protective functions.37  The individual is thought to be free in 
making decisions (choosing from many options) and responsible for the outcomes. 
Moreover, risk becomes the internalized risk of life itself (e.g. the risk of being 
old) and comes “from within”.38 In the same manner, community time is strangely 
curved in the process of socialization as it is the anticipation of the future (risk, 
creation of identity, etc.), not the sedimentation of the past (through memory, 
blood ties), whereas this future is already in the past. This is a time scheme similar 
to that of functioning of a prophet: the future relation of forces is anticipated 
and “overtaken” by the prophet. For Rose, and similarly in Deleuze’s theory the 
anticipation of the future somehow squeezes the past, present and future in a 
manner that results in annihilation of the past and present. Community is always 
“in the making”—the prophet detects the future wishes of God. Everything takes 
place in the immanence of the subject. As Rose’s analysis shows, subjects need to 
“catch” and “stick to” the communities that will accept and support them, in order 
to prove and announce their social legitimization through narration about the self. 
Constant communication helps subjects to anchor and stabilize themselves when 
the symbolic reality starts to become distorted39 with the “end of the social”. 
35 Ibid., 334.
36 Ibid., 336.
37 Ulrich Beck, “Loosing the Traditional: Individualization and Precarious Freedoms,” in Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-
Gernsheim, Individualization: institutionalized individualism and its social and political consequences (London: Sage, 
2002), 1–21.
38 Ibid., 2.
39 Małgorzata Jacyno, “Digital technologies and technologies of the self,” in Youth and Media. New Media and Cultural
Participation, ed. Jacek Wasilewski (Bern: Peter Lang, 2013), 87–92.
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The glaring feature of contemporary capitalism is that socialization does not 
coincide with the structure of the society in which it takes place. Put differently, needs 
and aspirations are detached from the capabilities of individuals.40 This phenomenon, 
where one’s (structural) possibilities are detached from one’s capabilities, reveals a 
certain passional subjugation to the mechanism of labor, salary and consumption, 
thereby securing the endurance of the employer–employee relationship.41 The 
Marxist-Spinozist clarification of this mechanism gives an insight into modern class 
relations but does not explain them fully. On the one hand, there is a constant moral 
valorization of social position, health, etc. These are seen as a matter of choice 
(of a level of education, doing sports, taking a job) and judged as good or bad 
decisions according to cultural patterns. For example, bad health is considered an 
effect of bad nutrition choices and a lack of physical activity, not as the outcome of 
working conditions or the lack of possibility to get specialist medical diagnosis and 
treatment.42 This kind of judgment is moral in this sense that it establishes the subject 
as exclusively responsible for her/his health condition and—as an effect—guilt if this 
condition is different from the culturally accepted pattern. On the other hand, social 
differences are being “culturalized” as patterns of consumption that are seemingly 
dependent on individual taste and creativity, whereas in fact taste and creativity 
are manifestations of one’s class position, meaning they depend on the amount of 
economic and cultural capital that one has.43 In individualizing societies the power 
of class distinctions still operates, which specifies who is and is not legitimized as a 
fully-fledged human being.
The aforementioned insights were reached drawing on the theory of Foucault, 
which resonates with the analysis of Deleuze and Guattari. Moreover, similar ideas can 
be discerned in the field of social sciences: Anthony Giddens’ diagnosis of reflexivity, 
Christopher Lasch’s “narcissistic personality”, or Beck’s idea of individualization. Their 
research resonates with Lazzarato’s and Rose’s diagnoses of the transformations 
of liberalism in the second half of the twentieth century. In contemporary society 
responsibilities, risks and chances, which used to be assigned to the state, are 
increasingly being immanentized and privatized. The point of reference for individuals 
becomes the social and communities. The domain of the social and communities 
crosses the domains of the economical, political and juridical. That creates new a 
40 The lack of possibilities - membership of the lower classes - is conceived as a moral defect. Dunn’s - see Elisabeth Dunn, 
Privatizing Poland: Baby Food, Big Business and the Remaking of Labor (New York: Cornell University Press, 2004), 144, 
170–172) - and Lazzarato’s research shows the disagreement for such categorization from those to whom it is applied. 
Disagreement, however, does not mean that counter discourses can easily (or ever) gain advantage.
41 Frédéric Lordon, Willing Slaves of Capital: Marx and Spinoza on Desire, trans. Gabriel Ash (London, New York: Verso, 
2014), 30-31.
42 Barbara Cruikshank showed that the term “empowerment”, used in welfare programs, suggests that social exclusion 
or poverty are a matter of “believing in oneself” and making choices. Barbara Cruikshank, “Revolutions within: self- 
government and self-esteem”, in Foucault and political reason: Liberalism, neo-liberalism and rationalities of government, 
ed. Barry Andrew, Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose (London: UCL Press & Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1996), 231-251.
43 See Malgorzata Jacyno, “Cultural omnivorousness?”, in Youth and Media: New Media and Cultural Participation, ed. 
Jacek Wasilewski (Bern: Peter Lang, 2013), 141.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 20/02/2020 23:23:26 |
[ 59 ]
CONATUS • JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY VOLUME 2, ISSUE 2 • 2017
“social subject”, a figure that combines the economic subject with political and 
juridical ones, that were dissociated at the previous stage of liberalism. On the one 
hand, society seems to evaporate in the amalgam of free, diverse individuals who are 
not bound to any ‘higher’ entity. On the other hand, these individuals act within the 
frames of the actions of others. What is experienced is not the death of society but 
the birth of new modes of socialization and governing, such as individualization. 
Debt and control
Debt is an assemblage of sad affects in the society of control. This implies 
that sad affects reduce body’s (individual’s) vital power. When transposed onto the 
psychic level, sad affects are those that set the frames of actions and individuation 
of human beings (subjectification). These boundaries are not predominantly good 
or evil; the functioning of a human entity is only possible within certain limits. At 
stake, then, is the manner in which they are established and what the resulting field 
within the boundaries is like. This process does not happen without a society, i.e., 
the sphere of relations surrounding the subject, such as hierarchy, language, law. 
Nietzsche, Foucault and Deleuze investigate the mutual processes of interiorization/
exteriorization of subjectivity and society. They stress that society is conditioned by 
subjectification (the creation of ego or the self as it is plugged into a transcending 
structure) because of which, in this case, writing about affects necessarily involves 
writing about the psyche. Debt actualizes itself in the indebtedness of the individual 
very literally nowadays, but more importantly, it is a mode of subjectification. Debt is 
a mechanism enabling the settlement of subjectivity—“ego”—in relation to society, 
whilst simultaneously creating relations of power where the subject is guilty, that is, 
responsible for her/his indebtedness. The guilty subject is alone, because the debt is 
infinite, it can never be repaid, and at the same time individual and secularized. The 
subject cannot appeal to any transcendent or historical entity (law, fate, descent or 
society). 
Debt changes according to the transformations of capitalism. Deleuze maintains 
that the never-ending expansion of capitalism runs twofold: outside, by broaching 
other terrains, modes of production, etc, and inside, through subjectification and 
incorporation. Hence, different modes of socialization and of social assemblages 
are necessary. Here, semiotics plays the role of the condition of possibility and the 
milieu of action for socialization. Semiotics is not transcendent nor does it impose a 
mode of functioning, but rather is an (analytically distinguishable) assemblage. Put 
differently, the regime of signs is a mode of socialization and an internal structure of 
thinking. Contemporary debt functions according to mixed semiotics, where the traits 
of signifying and postsignifying regime coexist. This coexistence can be recognized 
in the example of debt itself: the indebtedness to banks (loans incurred by individuals 
and states) and the way residues of the welfare state function are paradigmatic for 
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the external power of the despot. At the same time, however, there is another kind of 
indebtedness rising: immanent, with a disturbed order of time, where no one speaks 
about debt or obligation, rather the jargon of guilt and authenticity leads here. “You 
should” is not said to the subject indebted by an agent of power (state or religious), 
but is uttered by the subject herself/himself instead, like in the passional regime. The 
second kind of debt is of special interest here, as it is strictly connected with the 
society of control. Although the first kind of indebtedness is specifically linked and 
suited to the image of control, the second kind is more interesting and analytically 
more important. Although long-term loans and credit cards also establish a never 
ending cycle of borrowing and repaying debt as an apparatus of socialization results 
in immanent-infinite debt in a strict sense. It concerns individuals and creates specific 
subjects and a particular mode of power. 
How is this possible? The answer was given by the aforementioned sociologists 
and should be translated into the notions used in Deleuze’s description: Control 
is a power that, because of debt, operates on the level of affects as an internal, 
“incorporated” force: it does not capture, it hooks. Sad affects do not operate from 
without, but become internal. This means that the subject will act according to this 
affect as if it was a joyful one. The specificity of control does not lie in this process, as 
it is a typical mechanism of ressentiment, but in the fact that the subject is “hooked” 
by control and simultaneously detached through the mechanism characteristic for 
the passional regime of signs. There is not one fixed point of subjectification. The 
individual is being “interpellated” to be a subject, but the “point of subjectification” 
turns out to be the very self. Therefore, existence of the “self” (ego) enables 
power of control to anticipate and attach to the process of individuation. Control, 
however, similar to the despotic regime of signs, requires something external other 
than the ego anchoring points. These points can be Rose’s “communities”44 based 
on identification. A community does not have to call itself a community, it may be 
a kind of defined and shared identity (such as sexual or national) or a lifestyle (also 
attached to sexuality, hobby or religion), but it has to be created and supported. A 
community cannot replace the ego as the point of subjectification, but can “absorb” 
it. While the ego is subjugated to the community, the subject does not internalize 
the community; it is rather an emanation of subjectivity outside the individual. This 
is one of the series of control: mixed semiotics that operate through subjugation 
and “interpellation”; ego as a point of subjectification; community which enables 
attachment and narration; narration on the self (communication) as another point of 
fixation; debt is a particular assemblage of sad affects which attaches to individual 
forces, rather than capturing them. The game is no longer played outside, in society 
or the system. But has it ever, or has it just lost the character of semblance?
44 Nikolas Rose, “The Death of the Social? Re-figuring the Territory of Government”, in Economy and Society 25, no. 3 
(1996): 328, 352 [reprinted in: Governing the Present. Administering Economic, Social and Personal Life, ed. Peter Miller 
and Nikolas Rose (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), 85–113].
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